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to defeat the jurisdictional diversity and venue requirements of the
federal courts. This problem could be alleviated if Congress would
modify these requirements as it has for interpleader 5 3 and thirdparty actions," so that joinder of a non-diverse indispensable party
would not divest the federal court of jurisdiction. The same would
be true of venue. In this way, one of the more serious problems
inherent in the indispensable party doctrine would be eliminated
and the doctrine made more practical and workable in the federal
courts.
Considering the above application of rule 19(b) to the instant
case, the end result should not be criticized. However, the broad
holding of the Court could militate against a flexible application
of rule 19(b), while a discretionary dismissal would have been in
accord with the intent of the revisors and applicable case law.

IMMIGRATION RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION ALIENS WITH
FAMILIAL TIES AND WHO WILFULLY EVADED QUOTA RESTRICTIONS

Two aliens
separately entered the United States by misrepresenting their
immigrant quota status; thereafter, each became a parent of an
American citizen. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
ordered the aliens deported on the ground that they were "excludable at entry" as not having been of the proper status under the
quota specified by the immigrant visa. The aliens had contended
that they were nevertheless saved from deportation by Section
241 (f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act which exempts
aliens who enter fraudulently, who have close familial relationships
with American citizens, and who were "otherwise admissible" at
time of entry. On review of the respective cases, the courts of
appeals came to an opposite conclusion. In resolving the conflict,
the United States Supreme Court concluded that neither alien
was deportable, holding that although they had misrepresented
their quota status for the purpose of evading the quota restrictions,
the aliens were nevertheless "otherwise admissible" at the time of
entry. Immigration & NaturalizationServ. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214
(1966).
With the exception of the Alien Act of 1798, which allowed
the President to order the deportation of any alien he deemed
ARE "OTHERWISE ADMISSIBLE" AT TIME OF ENTRY. -

5328 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964).

54 Williams v. Keyes, 125 F.2d 208 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
699 (1942).
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dangerous to the country,' the national immigration policy was
mainly one of indifference until the late nineteenth century. At
this time, restrictive measures were enacted aimed at remedying
particular problems caused by the prior laissez-faire immigration
policy. First, in order to protect the nation from immigrants who
threatened to become public burdens, legislation was passed in
1882 to exclude paupers and criminals. 2 This list of undesirables
was later expanded to include idiots, insane persons, and people
with loathsome or contagious diseases.3 Second, to protect the
domestic labor force, Congress enacted alien contract labor laws
which prohibited the importation of cheap foreign labor.4 Further
safeguards for the American worker were embodied in a law
restricting the immigration of Chinese.2 This act was of additional
importance in that, for the first time, exclusion was predicated
on nationality. Further restrictions on the immigration of Asians
were incorporated in the 1917 act,0 passed to codify and supplement previous immigration legislation. Despite
these qualitative
7
restrictions, massive immigration continued.
The first quota law,8 enacted in 1921, imposed quantitative
restrictions on immigrants of all nationalities. 9 A prospective immigrant had to meet two tests: (1) the qualitative standards of the
1917 act, and (2) the quota requirements of the 1921 act. Significantly, the 1921 act exempted certain "nonquota" immigrants
from the numerical limitations. Among these exemptions was a
provision for aliens under eighteen years of age whose parents
were United States citizens.10 Furthermore, preference quota status
was afforded the wives, parents, brothers, sisters and fiancees of
American citizens and aliens in the United States who had applied
" Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, § 2, 1 Stat. 571. The law lapsed
in 1800 and was not renewed. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ai. Nmvs 1655-56

(1952).
2Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
3Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084.
4 Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332, as amended, Act of
Feb. 23, 1887, ch. 220, 24 Stat. 414.
5 Chinese Exclusion Acts, Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58.
However, this legislation did not prohibit the immigration of professional
people or students.
6Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 876.
7AJERBACH,

1961).

IIAMIGRATION

LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES

s Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5.

472 (2d ed.

9 The number of aliens admissible was limited to three per cent of
the number of foreign born persons of that particular nationality who were
residents here in 1910. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5.
The system resulted in the admission of approximately 350,000 immigrants
per year, mostly from Northern and Western Europe. 2 U.S. CODE CoNG.
& AD. Nevs 1667 (1952).
10 Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a) (8), 42 Stat. 5.
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for citizenship." These preferences and nonquota exemptions were
generally followed in the 1924 Immigration Act' 2 and the 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act. 13
A basic objective of immigration law was discernible in these
quota laws. The preferences and exemptions indicated a desire
to preserve the family and to reunite separated families. This
intent was further manifested in the War Brides Act '" which
provided special entry for families of armed service personnel.
While such measures evidenced Congress' desire to maintain family
unity, this desire did not become apparent in deportation policy
until recently. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act included
a provision for deportation of any alien who had gained entry by
misrepresentation or other fraudulent means.' 5 Congress recognized
the harshness of this deportation section in cases where war
refugees 16 misstated their place of birth or personal data because
of fear of repatriation to their former homelands.'
As a consequence, relief from deportation based on such misrepresentations
was granted to refugees under Section 7 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act on the condition that the misrepresentation was
not made for the purpose of evading the quota restrictions or of preventing an investigation. s Furthermore, section 7 included a provision which reflected Congress' reluctance to disrupt a family,
one of whose members was a citizen or permanent resident. Relief
from deportation on the ground of fraud on entry was afforded
to an alien who was "the spouse, parent, or a child of a United
States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi11Act
of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2(d), 42 Stat 6.
' 2 Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153.
1366 Stat. 175 (1952), as amended, 79 Stat. 911 (1965),

8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1351 (Supp. I, 1965).
14 Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659.
15 Section 212(a) (19)
provides for exclusion at entry of any alien

who sought to enter the United States by fraud or wilful misrepresentation
of a material fact. 66 Stat. 183 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 118 2 (a) (19) (1964).
Section 241(a) (1) makes deportable any alien who was within any one
of the excludable classes at time of entry. 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (a) (1) (1964).
See Landon v. Clarke, 239 F.2d 631 (1st Cir.
1956).
1 These refugees were admitted under the Displaced Persons Act,
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat 1009.
1 H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), 2 U.S. CODE CoNG.
& AD. NEws 1653, 1704 (1952).
1s The proviso to section 7 required that the refugee "establish to the
satisfaction of the Attorney General that the misrepresentation was
predicated upon the alien's fear of persecution because of race, religion,
or political opinion if repatriated to his former home or residence, and
was not committed for the purpose of evading the quota restrictions . . .
or an investigation of the alien at the place of his former home...
Act of Sept. 11, 1957, § 7, 71 Stat. 640-41.
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dence.""
Although the prohibition against misrepresentation for
the purpose of evading the quota limitations applied only to the
refugee, there was an additional requirement, applicable to both
the refugee and the alien with family ties, that the alien have been
"otherwise admissible at the time of entry." 20 When the relief
provision was codified in 1961, the special consideration for the
refugee, having served its purpose, was deleted. The preferential
treatment of aliens with family ties was continued by Section 241 (f)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act which provides:
The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens
within the United States on the ground that they were excludable
at the time of entry as aliens who have sought to procure, or have
procured visas or other documentations, or entry into the United
States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien
otherwise admissible at time of entry who is the spouse, parent,
or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted
2
for permanent residence. 1

Because the statute provides relief from deportation on the
ground of fraud if the alien is "otherwise admissible," it follows
that the fraudulent act itself is not determinative. Instead, it must
be found that the fact concealed or misrepresented, or any other
independent ground, has rendered the alien not "otherwise admissible" at the time of entry.22
Despite the apparent significance of the "other-wise admissible"
requirement, this term has received little judicial attention. In
one case directly construing the phrase, the court of appeals held
that the alleged deportee's concealed Communist Party affiliation
at the time of entry rendered him not "otherwise admissible." 23
It should be noted that the fact concealed in that case related to a
10Act of Sept.
20 Ibid.
2175 Stat. 655
22

11, 1957, §7, 71 Stat. 640-41.
(1961), S U.S.C. §1251(f) (1964).

(Emphasis added.)

It must also be noted that although section 241(f), on its face,

applies primarily when the government seeks to expel the alien on the
ground that he was excludable at entry under section 212(a)(19),
i.e., having procured a visa or entry by fraud or misrepresentation,
section 241(f) has been ruled to waive deportation based on grounds
flowing from such fraud, regardless of the specific section upon which
the charges are based. For example, an alien who enters without inspection is deportable under section 241(a)(2), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (2) (1964). Nevertheless, it has been ruled that an alien who
avoided the inspection by posing as an American was saved from deportation by § 241(f). Matter of K, 9 I. & N. Dec. 585 (1962).
23Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1961). But see
Bufalino v. Holland, 277 F.2d 270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863
(1960).
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qualitative aspect of the alien's inadmissibility. The problem of
inadmissibility because of concealment of a fact affecting the alien's
quota status, a quantitative ground, has been treated on the administrative level, resulting however in diverse determinations. For
example, in Matter of D'O-, 24 the alleged deportee was a native
of Italy and gained nonquota status by posing as a native of
Argentina. The Board of Immigration Appeals held that while
section 7, predecessor of section 241(f), excuses the perpetration
of fraud, it does not wipe out the existence of all other grounds
of inadmissibility which might be present. Thus, the petitioner
was not "otherwise admissible" because she did not come within
the prescribed quota for Italian nationals. On the other hand, in
Matter of K-, 22 petitioner, husband of a citizen, had gained
preference status and avoided the oversubscribed Rumanian quota
by posing as a German. The Board held him not deportable
although his misrepresentation may have been made to evade the
quota restrictions.b
This inconsistency was also apparent in the courts. In Scott
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,27 petitioner entered into a
sham marriage with an American citizen in Jamaica for the sole
purpose of gaining nonquota status. After arriving in the United
States, petitioner gave birth to an illegitimate child. Deportation
proceedings were brought against Scott as an alien excludable at
entry under Section 211(a) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act because she was not a nonquota immigrant as specified in her
visa. 8 With respect to the applicability of section 241(f),29 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that she would be
saved from deportation regardless of the section used against her
if she was "otherwise admissible" at the time of entry.30 The
issue was reduced, then, simply to whether a person who had used
248 I.
predecessor
258 I.
predecessor
26Ibid.

& N. Dec. 215 (1958).

This case was decided under the

of section 241(f).
& N. Dec. 310 (1959).
of section 241(f).

This case was decided under the

27350 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1965).
2866 Stat. 181 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1181 (a) (3) (1964).
Section 241
(a) (1) makes deportable any alien who was excludable at time of entry.
66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1) (1964).
29Before discussing the meaning of "otherwise admissible," the court
rejected petitioner's contention that she was not excludable at time of
entry because her marriage to an American citizen was valid under
Jamaican law. The court concluded that "a marriage contracted solely
to circumvent the immigration laws, with no intention that the parties
will ever live together, does not suffice to make the alien the 'spouse'
of a United States citizen" for immigration purposes. Scott v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 350 F.2d 279, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1965).
30 Id. at 282.
See supra note 22.

197

RECENT DECISIONS

fraudulent means to evade the quota restrictions was "otherwise
admissible." The court stated that although the phrase was subject
to differing interpretations, it encompassed "all grounds of inadmissibility . . . including quantitative standards. Any other interpretation is likely to invite frustration and wholesale evasion of
the quota system. . . ." '

The court refuted the argument that

its interpretation rendered the phrase "otherwise admissible" meaningless, concluding that section 241(f) saved the alien from
32
deportation for the fraud itself but not for an underlying offense.
In Errico v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,33 petitioner
had misrepresented himself as a skilled mechanic in order to gain
first preference immigration status as a person "needed urgently
in the United States because of . . . technical training." 34 After
admission into the United States, Errico and his wife had a son.
Deportation proceedings were brought against Errico as an alien
excludable at time of entry under section 211(a) (4) because he
was not of the quota specified in his immigrant visa.35 Errico's
claim for relief under section 241(f) was granted, the court stating
that the dispensation was not reserved only to those aliens charged
with fraud.3 In determining whether the petitioner was "otherwise admissible," the court reasoned that if an alien did not qualify
because of a quantitative ground, the phrase would be stripped
"of all substantial meaning and purpose." 3 The court rejected
the idea that the possible encouragement of fraudulent entries was
a sufficient ground to deny the relief afforded by the "most reasonable construction" of the statute.38
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 39 in the
instant case in order to resolve the conflict between the courts of
appeals. The Government agreed at the outset that section 241(f)
could not be applied literally, so as to be limited to afford relief
40
only when deportation is predicated on the general fraud section.
31 Scott v. Immigration & Naturalization

(2d32Cir. 1965).

Serv., 350 F.2d 279, 283

d. at 284.
33349 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1965).

34 Immigration and Nationality Act §203(a)(1)(A), 66 Stat. 178 (1952),
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1) (A)

(1964).

35Immigration and Nationality Act §211(a)(4), 66 Stat. 191 (1952),
Section 241(a)(1) makes deportable
8 U.S.C. §1181(a)(4) (1964).
any alien who was excludable at the time of entry. 66 Stat. 204 (1952),

8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1) (1964).

36Errico v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 349 F.2d 541, 544
(9th Cir. 1965). See supra note 22.
37 Id. at 546.
38 Id. at 546-47.
39 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 383 U.S. 941 (1966).
& Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 217
40 Immigration
(1966).
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It was pointed out that under such a restricted interpretation, an
alien who had entered by fraud would be deportable, without
recourse, on a charge based on a defective visa or other documentary irregularity. As a consequence, section 241(f) was deemed
to waive "any deportation charge that results directly from the
misrepresentation regardless of the section under which the charge
was brought, provided that the alien was 'otherwise admissible at
the time of entry.'

"41

The real issue, then, was the meaning of the phrase "otherwise
admissible." The Government argued that to be deemed "otherwise admissible," the alien must prove that if he had not lied he
would have been admitted.42 Since both aliens would have been
excluded because of their true quota status, such an interpretation
would have denied them relief. The aliens contended, on the
other hand, that the Government version of this term would negate
congressional intent to grant relief for fraud since it is precisely
their quota status that aliens would misrepresent.
The majority relied heavily on the legislative history of section
241(f) in their construction of "otherwise admissible." The Court
stated that the predecessor of section 241(f), section 7, provided
relief to both refugees and to aliens with the necessary family
relationships, but expressly withdrew relief if the fraud was used
to evade the quota laws or to frustrate investigation only in the
case of the refugees. From this difference in treatment, it was
inferred that such quota evasion and avoidance of investigation
did not disqualify the alien with a family from being "otherwise
admissible." The Court concluded that "Congress meant to specify
two specific types of fraud that would leave an alien [with a family]
'otherwise admissible'" but that would disqualify the refugee. The
fact that section 7 may have been primarily intended for the benefit
of Mexicans, who were not subject to quotas, did not imply that
aliens from countries that do have a quota must be within that
quota to be "otherwise admissible."
Although section 241(f)
deleted all provisions for refugees, the Court was certain that no
substantive change was intended with respect to aliens with family
ties.
Assuming that there was a doubt as to the language of section
241(f), the Court stated that, in view of the drastic nature of
deportation which is analogous to a criminal punishment, all doubt
should be resolved in favor of the alien. This is especially proper
in view of Congress' frequently manifested intent to maintain the
unity of a family, one of whose members is a citizen or permanent
resident. Legislative history indicated that "Congress felt that, in
412 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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many circumstances, it was more important to unite families and
preserve family
ties than it was to enforce strictly the quota
limitations . . ..,,43
The dissent objected to the Court's holding on two grounds.
The first objection related to the extensive applicability of section
241(f). Since deportation was not predicated on the fraud section,
section 241(f) should not have been invoked at all. The dissent
felt that the majority's position was "tantamount to holding that
[section 241 (f)] . . . is applicable to bar deportation based on any
ground so long as the alien lied about that ground. . . ." 4' This

point was dramatized by posing a hypothetical wherein a Communist who had lied about his party membership could invoke section
241(f) and escape deportation, but a Communist who admitted
to his affiliation and was admitted by administrative mistake would
be deported.-"
Even assuming the pervasive applicability of section 241(f),
the dissent excepted on the second ground that the aliens were
not "otherwise admissible" because they were outside their respective quota limitations at time of entry. It was insisted that "otherwise admissible" was a technical term including quota admissibility.
The dissent reasoned that "to except quota requirements of admissibility from the statutory qualification of 'otherwise admissible'
would undercut the elaborate quota system which was for years at
the heart of the immigration laws." 4"
The language of the dissent with respect to the general
applicability of section 241(f) conjures up the specter of granting
all undesirables immunity from deportation "on any ground at all
so long as the alien lied about that ground at the time of his
unlawful entry." 4 Assuming arguendo that there is some basis
for that fear, the dissent's alternative interpretation would emasculate section 241(f). Such a limited application invites the use
of procedural niceties by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in order to avoid the availability of relief. By grounding the
deportation charges on the documentary irregularity sections," s
instead of on the general fraud section, 40 relief would be precluded.50
43Id.

at 220.

4 Id. at
45 Id.at
6Id. at
47M. at

227-28.

228 n.3.
22.
227-22.

4"Immigration and Nationality Act §21 1(a)(1)-(4),
(1952), 8 U.S.C. §1181(a)(1)-(4) (1964).
49 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a) (19),

66 Stat. 181

66 Stat. 183 (1952),

9 U.S.C. § 1182(a) ( 1 9) (1964).
s0 The Board of Immigration Appeals agrees that the specific section
on which the charges are based is immaterial. Supra note 22.
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In any event, the fear of pervasive immunity is, in fact, ill-founded.
Although section 241(f) is generally applicable, it does not follow
that immunity will necessarily be granted. The dissent suggests
that a Communist who is admitted by error will be deported, while
one who lies about his affiliation will not. 51 It appears that the
dissent misinterprets the effect of the majority opinion. The
Court does not hold that a qualitative ground will also be included
under the "otherwise admissible" criterion. The opinion is addressed only to the issue of whether a quantitative ground is
included. It is submitted that the earlier court of appeals' holdings,
i.e., concealed Communist Party membership, a qualitative ground,
renders an alien not "otherwise admissible," 52 remains unaffected
by this decision.
Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion recognizes that the
decision goes to the "heart of the immigration laws." A basic
principle of our immigration policy since 1921 has been numerical
limitation based on national origin. As the present case illustrates,
these harsh restrictions could motivate fraudulent entries. The
restrictions were relaxed to some extent in 1965. 5 3 The aggregate
number of immigrants from non-Western Hemisphere countries
totals

170,000,

54

with the number of immigrants from any particular

country not to exceed 20,000. 55 This is a significant departure
from the "national origins" system whereby each particular nation
had a smaller specific allotment, 6 with no provision for the use of
another nation's unfilled quota. It is likely that these new provisions will reduce the waiting list of applicants, diminishing to a
certain degree the compulsion for fraudulent entry. However, the
new amendment does not obviate the motivation for fraud because
there still exists a numerical limitation. And as before, preferences,
including those for spouses of citizens 57 and for skilled workers,5 8
provide a convenient means for fraudulently obtaining priority
treatment. Thus the instant case will still be of considerable
importance in the future since situations similar to those in Scott
and Errico are likely to recur.
Although the holding of the majority with respect to Scott
might be seen as encouraging wholesale evasion of the quota laws
by the bearing of illegitimate children, this interpretation is un51 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 228
n.3 (1966).

52Sipra note 23.
5379 Stat. 911 (1965), 8 U.S.C. §§1101-1351 (Supp. I, 1965).
5479 Stat. 911 (1965), 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. I, 1965).
55579 Stat. 912 (1965), 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (Supp. I, 1965).
6Immigration and Nationality Act, Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477,
§ 201, 66 Stat. 175.
5779 Stat 911 (1965), 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. I, 1965).
58 79 Stat. 912 (1965), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. I, 1965).
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warranted. While Scott was saved from deportation because of
her illegitimate child, it is difficult to envision widespread promiscuity aimed at avoiding expulsion. A counterbalance to the possible
encouragement of the evasion of the quota laws is a more thorough
screening at the time of entry. It is recognized that detection of
a fraudulent marriage is difficult at the time of entry. Nevertheless, the imposition of a more severe penalty on the American citizen
who has participated in the fraudulent marriage would discourage
such sham relationships at the outset.
The effect of the present cases presents no real danger to any
vital national interests if the decision is read with the limitation
that it applies only to quantitative grounds for deportation. Although the majority does not distinguish qualitative and quantitative
grounds, it is submitted that the distinction is a valid one. A
criminal or pauper may become a public burden. A Communist
or other subversive is a threat to national security. An alien here
in violation of the quota laws, on the other hand, affects no
national interest other than enforcement of the quotas themselves.
Congress itself has placed the preservation of the family above
the blind imposition of numerical limitations. The instant case
reflects such a balancing of strict compliance with quotas against
the disruption of a family, a member of which is a citizen or
permanent resident. The balance struck by the Court, consistent
with Congress' humanitarian policy, avoids the hardship that would
befall not only the alien but also the innocent parties who would
be left behind.

